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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
court's criticism of the exclusive focus that White II placed on a single factor
in determining admiralty jurisdiction, attorneys in the Fourth Circuit should
avoid emphasizing only one factor when arguing the jurisdictional merits of
a claim.' 66 As Oman illustrates, a single factor seldom disposes of the nexus
requirement in a borderline case.' 67 Unfortunately, however, even if attorneys
persuade the court that a tort claim satisfies the nexus requirement, federal
courts following Oman will not hear the claim in admiralty unless the alleged
wrong occurred on navigable waters.
6
The Supreme Court in the landmark decision of Executive Jet redefined
the requirements for admiralty jurisdiction in tort actions. 69 Executive Jet,
however, applies in only a limited number of cases. 7 0 As the Supreme Court
stated in Executive Jet, most claims clearly fall either within or without the
admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. 7' The Supreme Court in Exec-
utive Jet adopted the nexus test to deal with "perverse and caustic borderline
situations.' ' 72 Notwithstanding the Oman court's continued adherence to the
strict locality test, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Oman provides a workable
means of applying the nexus test to determine on which side of the jurisdic-
tional border a claim should fall.
GARY BRYANT
III. BANKRUPTCY
Including a Child Support Arrearage
in a Chapter 13 Plan
Congress established Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act' (Code)
to provide individual debtors in financial difficulty an opportunity to settle
166. See Oman, 764 F.2d at 228-29 (criticizing exclusive focus on single factor to determine
whether claim meets requisite nexus).
167. Id. at 229. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (courts should analyze several
factors collectively to determine whether admiralty jurisdiction exists).
168. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text (under federal circuit's interpretation
of Executive Jet, tort claims must satisfy locality test before they are cognizable admiralty).
169. H. BAER, supra note 56, § 25-1 at 673.
170. See infra text accompanying notes 170-71 (Supreme Court in Executive Jet developed
nexus test to determine whether admiralty jurisdiction should lie in borderline cases).
171. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 225.
172. Id.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982). In 1970 Congress created a special commission to
study and recommend changes to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (1898 Act). Act of July 24, 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468; see Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
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debts without subjecting the debtor's assets to a Chapter 7 liquidation. 2
Congress expresses its legislative purpose throughout Chapter 13, which is
structured to facilitate the discharge of an individual's debts. 3 Chapter 13
allows the debtor to develop a flexible plan, according to his expected future
income,4 to extend payments of his debts over a maximum period of three
The 1898 Act failed to address the problems of modern day debtor-creditor relations because
the 1898 Act's last major revision had occurred in 1938. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
1-2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5787-88 [hereinafter cited as 1978
SENATE REPORT]; see Chandler Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 840 (amending 1898 Act). The efforts of
the special commission resulted in Congress' enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
Code) in November 1978 to modernize federal bankruptcy law. II U.S.C. § 101-151326
(Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978); see 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra at 1, 2 (purpose of Code to
modernize bankruptcy law).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1977)
(purpose of Chapter 13 is to afford to debtor with sustained periodic income flexible plan to
repay debts under court protection while avoiding liquidation), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 6079 [hereinafter cited as 1977 HousE REPORT]; see also In re Henry,
4 Bankr. 220, 223 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (purpose of Chapter 13 of Code is to allow debtor
to pay creditor from future income and to provide alternative to Chapter 7 liquidation). When
considering the proposal of Chapter 13 of the Code, Congress recognized that the amounts
offered by debtors for full settlement of the debtors' debts through a Chapter 13 plan would
vary according to the debtors' capabilities. See 1977 HousE REPORT, supra at 118. Congress,
however, noted that the Chapter 13 plan is desirable because the Chapter 13 plan allows the
debtor to support himself and his family while repaying his debts, to retain possession of his
assets, and to develop pride and credit standing by meeting his obligations. Id. In contrast, the
Chapter 7 liquidation process forces the debtor to give up all the property of his estate to satisfy
creditors and attaches a social stigma to the debtor. Id.; see II U.S.C. § 521(3), as amended
by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 452,
98 Stat. 333, 375 (debtor must relinquish all property of estate to trustee in Chapter 7
liquidation).
3. See 1977 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 118 (Chapter 13 of Code is structured to
facilitate discharge of debts); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982) (provisions allowing debtor
to discharge debts through flexible plan); id. § 1328(a) (upon completion of payments under
chapter 13 plan court shall grant debtor discharge of all debts included in plan).
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982) (discussing requirements of Chapter 13 plan). Although
the Code does not set specific minimum payments that a debtor must make under a Chapter
13 plan, the debtor must satisfy the best interest of creditors test that requires a Chapter 13
plan to propose payments that insure that all creditors receive at least the amount that they
would receive under a Chapter 7 liquidation. Id. § 1325(a)(4) (unsecured claims must receive at
least amount receivable through liquidation). If the trustee or an unsecured creditor objects to
confirmation of the debtor's plan, the Code requires the debtor to propose to submit all of his
projected disposable income to pay his obligations under the Chapter 13 plan for either the
prescribed duration of the plan or until full payment of all the debts included in the plan.
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §
317(3)(b)(1)(B), 98 Stat. 333, 356 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982)). The Code defines
disposable income as the income not necessary to support the debtor or the debtor's dependents
or to allow the debtor to carry on his livelihood. See id. § 317(3)(b)(2) (defining disposable
income for Chapter 13 purposes). In addition, the debtor must consider the "good faith"
requirement of a Chapter 13 plan as a prerequisite for confirmation. See I 1 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)
(court shall not confirm Chapter 13 plan unless debtor proposes plan in good faith). Although
the exact meaning of good faith is unclear in the Code, apparently the debtor must propose at
least honest intentions to meet his debts. See 3 L. KING, COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 1325.02,
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years.' The debtor's completion of the scheduled payments in accordance
with the Chapter 13 plan results in the discharge of the debts included in the
plan .
6
Chapter 13, however, excepts from discharge through a Chapter 13 plan
any debt to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor for alimony,
maintenance, or support.7 The discharge exception recognizes a state's'inter-
est, pursuant to its police power, in protecting the welfare of the state's
dependent citizens and in determining support obligations. Courts, however,
at 1325-4 (3rd ed. 1985) (good faith requires only honest intentions of debtor to meet
debts); see also Barnes v. Whelan, 8 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 855, 863-64 (D.C. in 1982)
(good faith is honest intent of debtor to fulfill plan as proposed); In re Henry, 4 Bankr.
220, 223-24 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (good faith requires fundamental fairness in dealing with
one's creditors); In re lacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256, 267-68 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) (good faith
requires proposal of meaningful repayment in light of debtor's particular financial situation).
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1982) (Chapter 13 plan must provide for payments over
three year period and court may extend period to five years). The extended payment provision
of Chapter 13 of the Code offers the debtor a greater opportunity to gain a fresh start than
Chapter 7 liquidation because Chapter 13 affords the debtor the opportunity to re-establish his
credit rating through the extended payments, while rehabilitating his financial condition. See
1977 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 118 (purpose of Chapter 13 is to allow debtor to repay
debts and establish better credit rating than if debtor proceeded under Chapter 7 liquidation);
3 L. KING supra note 4, 1325.02, AT 1325-3 (SAME); see also supra note 2 (comparing benefits
to debtor under Chapter 13 plan and Chapter 7 liquidation).
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1982) (completion of Chapter 13 plan discharges debts);
supra note 4 (discussing requirements of Chapter 13 plan). Chapter 13 of the Code does not
require a debtor to propose full payment of the debts included in a Chapter 13 plan for the
court to confirm the Chapter 13 plan. See II U.S.C. § 1325 (discussing requirements of Chapter
13 plan). Upon completion of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan, even though the plan does not
provide for full payment of the debtor's debts, the court shall relieve the debtor of all claims
for debts provided for in the Chapter 13 plan. See id. § 1328(a) (upon completion of Chapter
13 plan, court shall grant discharge of all debts provided for in plan except debts on which
final payment is due after completion of plan and debts for alimony or support).
7. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982); see id. § 1328(a)(2) (providing for discharge of debts
in Chapter 13 proceeding). Section 1328(a)(2) of the Code excepts from discharge through a
Chapter 13 plan any debt of the kind specified in § 523(a)(5) of the Code. Id. § 1328(a)(2); see
id. § 523(a)(5). Section 523(a)(5) of the Code excepts from discharge, under all bankruptcy
proceedings, any debt for alimony, maintenance, or child support arrearages if the underlying
obligation to pay arises from a separation agreement, divorce decree, or other order of a court
of record. Id. § 523(a)(5). A precondition to nondischargeability under the Code, however, is
that the arrearage must be for payments that are actually support payments. Id. § 523(a)(5)(B).
Furthermore, bankruptcy courts possess jurisdiction to determine what constitutes support for
dischargeability purposes. See In re Miller, 36 Bankr. 403, 405 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)
(bankruptcy court's jurisdiction extends to determine nature of obligation for dischargeability
purposes); In re Jones, 28 Bankr. 147, 149-50 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1983) (dischargeability of
arrearage on state imposed support obligation is federal question under bankruptcy law); In re
Lovett, 6 Bankr. 270, 271-72 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) (although state law governs determination
of support obligation itself, federal law determines what constitutes support for discharge
purposes); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434, 439 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) (federal law determines what
actually constitutes support for purpose of determining dischargeability of debt), aff'd by, In
re Comer, 723 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1984).
8. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1328(a)(2), 523(a)(5) (1982) (support arrearage is not dischargeable
through bankruptcy process); see also In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (regulation of
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must balance the state's interest with the congressional purpose underlying
Chapter 13 of the Code to facilitate individual financial rehabilitation and
to insure that a Chapter 13 plan effectively deals with the debtor's obliga-
tions.9 The Code attempts to balance the competing state and federal interests
in a Chapter 13 proceeding through technical provisions that provide avenues
of protection to the dependent citizens of the state as well as the debtor. 0
The Code's attempt to balance the competing state and federal interests
precipitates the issue whether federal courts may allow a debtor to include
an arrearage of a state-determined support obligation in a Chapter 13 plan
that provides full payment of the arrearage, affording the debtor an orderly
disposition of a debt while precluding the state from enforcing the depend-
ent's claim to the arrearage." In Caswell v. Lang,'2 the Fourth Circuit
considered whether a debtor could include payment of a child support
arrearage in a Chapter 13 plan that provides full payment of the arrearage.13
In Caswell, the debtor filed a Chapter 13 payment plan,' 4 that established
two classes of unsecured creditors, one of which consisted solely of the
debtor's ex-wife, Judith Lang.' 5 The debtor's proposed plan provided for
full payment of the debtor's child support arrearage 6 and 25% payment to
domestic relations is reserved to states); Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 137 (9th Cir. 1982)
(federal courts should not interfere in domestic relations issue if federal court must determine
amount of support payments); In re Moore, 22 Bankr. 200, 201 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982)
(federal bankruptcy courts do not exercise jurisdiction to alter or modify state imposed support
provision); In re Lovett, 6 Bankr. 270, 271 (Bankr..D. Utah 1980) (state law governs underlying
obligation of support liability); infra notes 86-93 and accompanying (discussing federal obsten-
tion doctrine).
9. See In re Summerlin, 26 Bankr. 875, 877 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1983) (court must balance
interests of support claimant with interests of debtor seeking rehabilitation through Chapter 13
of Code); In re Lovett, 6 Bankr. 270, 271 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) (courts must balance roles of
federal and state courts in bankruptcy process); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text
(explaining purpose of Chapter 13 of Code).
10. See infra notes 46-67 and accompanying text (discussing avenues of protection provided
to dependents and debtor by Code.).
11. See I 1 U.S.C. § 1327(c) (1982) (providing that property of debtor is free and clear of
claims of creditors provided for in Chapter 13 plan). The debtor's inclusion of a support
arrearage in a chapter 13 plan triggers § 1327(c) of the Code, which precludes the dependent
from enforcing his claim for the support arrearage against the debtor's property. Id. Excluding
a support arrearage from a Chapter 13 plan, on the other hand, allows the support obligee to
proceed against the debtor's property because excluding the support arrearage would not trigger
§ 1327(c). See id. (protecting property of debtor only against claims of creditors provided for
in Chapter 13 plan).
12. 757 F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 1985).
13. Id. at 611.
14. Id. at 608; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322 (1982) (in Chapter 13 proceeding debtor shall
file plan setting forth proposed schedule of payments to satisfy debts).
15. 757 F.2d at 608. In a Chapter 13 plan under the Code, a debtor may designate classes
of unsecured creditors with similar claims, but the plan may, not discriminate unfairly among
the different claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1)(1982) (Chapter 13 plan may classify unsecured
claims).
16. 757 F.2d at 608. In Caswell v. Lang, the debtor was $1400 in arrears on child support
payments at the time he filed a Chapter 13 plan. Id. at 608 n.l.
[Vol. 43:431
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all other unsecured creditors as a class for full settlement of the claims held
by the unsecured creditors against the debtor.' 7 Judith Lang filed a proof of
claim for the child support arrearage in bankruptcy court.' Judith Lang
later objected to the bankruptcy court's confirmation of the debtor's pro-
posed plan, claiming that the plan was not feasible and that she should
receive payment of the support arrearage in full prior to any payment to all
other unsecured creditors. 9 The bankruptcy court concluded that because
the state possesses exclusive authority to determine support obligations, it
would be unwise for a federal court to assume jurisdiction over the support
obligation by including the support arrearage in a Chapter 13 plan.20 The
bankruptcy court found that the inclusion of support arrearages in Chapter
13 plans would require federal courts to police child support and possibly
could abridge the states' interest in protecting their minors by providing a
shield to Chapter 13 debtors from state enforcement of the arrearages. 2' The
17. Id. at 608-09. Although a Chapter 13 plan may not discriminate unfairly among the
different classes established by the plan, the debtor may discriminate in the percentage of
payment to each class of unsecured creditors if a reasonable basis exists for the discrimination.
See In re Wolff, 6 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 1282, 1284 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (if
discrimination is necessary to carry out chapter 13 plan and debtor proposes plan in good faith,
then discrimination is justified); In re Kovich, 4 Bankr. 403, 405-07 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980)
(debtor may propose Chapter 13 plan providing greater percentage of payment to one class of
unsecured creditors than other classes if reasonable and necessary basis exists for discrimination);
see also In re Sutherland, 3 Bankr. 420, 421-22 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1980) (permitting debtor to
pay percentage of one debt to one class and nothing to other class); cf. In re Cooper, 3 Bankr.
246, 249 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (disallowing discrimination among percentage of payments to
different classes of unsecured claims because debtor showed no justification for discrimination);
In re Fizer, 1 Bankr. 400, 402 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1979) (finding discrimination unfair because
debtor advanced no basis for discrimination). Courts considering discrimination that results
from payment of child support arrearages in full through a Chapter 13 plan while all other
classes receive less than full payment, have found that the discrimination is not unfair because
a reasonable basis has existed for the discrimination. See In re Haag, 3 Bankr. 649, 651 (Bankr.
D. Or. 1980) (discrimination is fair when rational basis exists for discrimination between one
class for payment of support arrears and second class consisting of all other unsecured claims).
Courts have explained that because a debtor may not discharge child support arrearages through
the bankruptcy process, the support obligation possesses a higher status than ordinary debts in
bankruptcy and the nondischargeability restriction may require discrimination to avail the debtor
of the Chapter 13 process. See In re Haag, 3 Bankr. at 651 (distinguishing support arrearage
from ordinary debt and finding that Chapter 13 may be unavailable without allowing discrimi-
nation); In re Curtis, 2 Bankr. at 44-45 (support arrearages possess higher status than ordinary
debts in bankruptcy).
18. 757 F.2d at 609. Section 501(a) of the Code allows a creditor to file a proof of claim,
and § 502(a) of the Code allows the § 501(a) claim absent an objection by a party in interest.
11 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 502(a) (1982).
19. 757 F.2d at 609.
20. Id.
21. See id. supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (discussing states' power to determine
support obligations and states' interest in protecting dependent citizens); supra note 11 and
accompanying text (including support arrearage in confirmed chapter 13 plan prevents enforce-
ment of dependent's claim for arrearage against debtor's property, depriving dependent of
immediate ability to enforce state-imposed support obligation).
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bankruptcy court, therefore, held that child support arrearages are not
includable in Chapter 13 plans. 2 The debtor appealed to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 23 The district court found
that the Code did not intend federal courts to interfere with state imposed
domestic remedies and held that federal courts could not modify or discharge
a state imposed child support obligation. 24 The district court, therefore,
affirmed the bankruptcy court's holding that a Chapter 13 plan may not
include child support arrearages.
25
The debtor appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.26 On appeal, the debtor argued
that the scope of Chapter 13 properly encompasses the inclusion of child
support arrearages to afford the debtor an orderly disposition of his debts
and to assure unsecured creditors the greatest possible payment on their
claim. 27 In support of his argument, the debtor claimed that other federal
courts had allowed Chapter 13 plans to include child support arrearages and,
therefore, had established his right to include his child support arrearage in
a Chapter 13 plan as well.
28
22. 757 F.2d at 609.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text (discussing federal abstention policy).
25. 757 F.2d at 609.
26. Id.
27. Id. Under § 1327(c) of the Code, including child support arrearage in a Chapter 13
plan frees the property of the debtor from the support obligee's claim for the support arrearage.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(c) (1982) (property of debtor is free and clear of any claim provided for
in plan). Relieving the debtor of the support obligee's claim against his property affords the
debtor greater flexibility in formulating an acceptable Chapter 13 plan. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text. The debtor knows that he can apply his future income towards an extended
payment of the support arrearage, without the concern that he may need his future income to
protect his property in a subsequent suit by the support obligee for the arrearages. See infra
notes 46-50 and accompanying text (automatic stay imposed upon filing of Chapter 13 petition
protects property of debtor until confirmation of plan); infra note 53 and accompanying text
(confirmation of Chapter 13 plan protects debtor's property from claims provided for in plan).
furthermore, confirmation of an acceptable Chapter 13 plan insures that unsecured creditors
receive the greatest possible payment. See supra note 4 (creditors receive at least amount that
they would receive on their claim upon liquidation under Chapter 7).
28. 757 F.2d at 609. In Caswell, the debtor relied on two cases to support his argument
that a Chapter 13 plan properly may include child support arrearages. Id.; see In re Haag, 3
Bankr. 649, 650-51 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980) (confirming chapter 13 plan that provided 1007o
payment of child support arrearage); In re Curtis, 2 Bankr. 43, 44-45 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1979)
(same). The debtor relied on In re Curtis in which the bankruptcy court considered whether to
confirm a Chapter 13 plan providing for 100% payment of the debtor's child support arrearage
and 10% payment of all other unsecured creditors. 757 F.2d at 609; see In re Curtis, 2 Bankr.
43, 45 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1979). The Curtis court found that because child support arrearages
are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, a rational basis existed for the discrimination between the
percentage of payments and, accordingly, confirmed the Chapter 13 plan including the child
support arrearage. In re Curtis, 2 Bankr. at 44-45. the debtor also relied on In re Haag in
which the bankruptcy court considered whether to confirm a chapter 13 plan that effectively
created two classes of unsecured creditors by providing 100% payment of child support
arrearages and 25% payment to all other unsecured claims. 757 F.2d at 609; see In re Haag, 3
[Vol. 43:431
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The Fourth Circuit first addressed the debtor's claim that prior case law
had established the debtor's right to include his child support arrearage in a
Chapter 13 plan.29 The Caswell court found that the cases on which the
debtor relied merely had assumed that a Chapter 13 plan properly may
include child support arrearages.3 0 The Caswell court found that because the
cases on which the debtor relied had not addressed directly whether the
debtor may include a support arrearage in a Chapter 13 plan, the cases did
not support the debtor's contention. 3' After concluding that the cases relied
upon by the debtor were unsupportive, the Fourth Circuit considered the
effect that the inclusion of child support arrearages in a Chapter 13 plan
would have on the state's interest in protecting the welfare of its dependent
citizens.3 2 The Caswell court held that the inclusion of child support arrear-
ages in a Chapter 13 plan would infringe upon a dependent's state-imposed
support obligation and, therefore, affirmed the district court's order disal-
lowing support arrearages in a Chapter 13 plan.3
In support of its holding in Caswell, the fourth Circuit relied on the
policy of federal abstention in areas of domestic relations and the abstention
policy's limitation on a federal court's interference with state imposed
remedies in areas of particular state concern. 34 The Fourth Circuit first noted
Bankr. 649, 650 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980). The Haag court found that a rational basis existed for
the discrimination in the percentage of payment proposed to each class of unsecured creditors
because disallowing the percentage discrepancy would force the debtor to elect Chapter 7
liquidation, through which the second class of unsecured creditors would receive nothing. 3
Bankr. at 651. The Haag court, therefore, confirmed the Chapter 13 plan in light of the debtor's
proposed 100% payment of support arrearages. Id.
29. 757 F.2d at 609.
30. Id.; see supra note 28 (cases relied upon by debtor dealt with issue of discrimination
between classes of unsecured creditors); supra note 17 (Chapter 13 plan may not discriminate
unfairly between classes of unsecured creditors). The Caswell court stated that even if the cases
relied upon by the debtor support the inclusion of support arrearages in a Chapter 13 plan, the
bankruptcy court's interpretation of the Code does not bind a federal circuit court. 757 F.2d
at 609.
31. 757 F.2d at 609; see supra note 28 (cases relied on by debtor considered whether
discrimination between classes of unsecured creditors in Chapter 13 plan was fair).
32. 757 F.2d at 610.
33. Id. at 610-11.
34. Id. Article I of the United States Constitution does not vest specifically in Congress
the power to legislate in areas of domestic relations, such as support obligations. See U.S.
CONsr. art. I, § 8 (granting specific powers to Congress). Because the Constitution reserves to
the states the powers not granted specifically to Congress, states possess the power to govern
areas of domestic relations. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. X (powers not granted specifically to
Congress are reserved to states); see also McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220 (1981) (states
govern areas of domestic relations); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 389 (1971) (Black,
J., dissenting) (state courts possess exclusive domain over issues of alimony, support, and
maintenance); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (subject of domestic relations belongs
to state law). The federal law, however, may supersede state law if the effect of the state law
infringes on the congressional objective in enacting the federal law. See U.S. CONsr. art. VI,
cl.2 (laws of United States are supreme law of land); see also Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S.
46, 54-55 (1981) (although state law generally governs domestic relations, federal courts must
protect rights and expectancies established by federal law); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666
1986]
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that the United States supreme court historically has favored exclusive state
control over the collection of child support payments. 3- The Fourth Circuit
also recognized Virginia's active policy to protect its minors. 36 The Fourth
Circuit found that the inclusion of support arrearages in Chapter 13 plans
would result in a "great injustice" by forcing dependents to defer their right
to collect past due support payments to a Chapter 13 scheduled payment
plan.37 The Caswell court explained that interference with a state imposed
support obligation would abridge the compelling interest of the state, pur-
suant to the state's police power, to protect the welfare of its citizens38 and
would extend the application of the Code beyond its congressionally intended
bounds. 39 The Fourth Circuit feared that extending the chapter 13 plan to
include child support arrearages would invite federal courts to alter or modify
state imposed domestic obligations that should remain immune from federal
disturbance. 40 The Fourth Circuit, accordingly, held that a Chapter 13 plan
(1962) (state interest is immaterial if state law conflicts with valid federal law). The Caswell
court recognized that a state domestic decree must abridge a substantial federal interest before
federal law will supersede the state decree. 757 F.2d at 610 n.3; see McCarty v. McCarty, 453
U.S. at 220 (state domestic law must abridge substantial federal interest before supremacy clause
will warrant federal law overriding state law). The Caswell court also recognized that a state
decree must yield to a clearly conflicting federal statute. 757 F.2d at 610 n.3. The Caswell court
found, however, that congress did not intend specifically that a chapter 13 plan should include
child support arrearages. Id. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, concluded that the state law did
not conflict with federal law to compel overriding the state imposed support obligation. Id.
35. 757 F.2d at 610; see McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220-21 (1981) (states govern
areas of domestic relations unless consequences of state law abridge federal objectives); Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 389 (1971) (state courts possess exclusive domain over issues of
alimony, support and maintenance); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (subject of
domestic relations belongs to laws of states); see also supra note 34 (discussing states' power to
govern area of domestic relations).
36. 757 F.2d at 610; see VA. CODE § 20-107.2 (1984) (state court shall determine custody
and support of minor children). The Caswell court emphasized Virginia's policy requiring
parental support of minor children and the state concern expressed for the welfare of the child.
757 F.2d at 610; see Featherstone v. Brooks, 220 Va. 443, 448, 258 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1979)
(Virginia law imposes on both parents duty to support minor child); Mullen v. Mullen, 188 Va.
259, 269, 49 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1948) (welfare of infant is primary consideration of court in
custody controversies).
37. 757 F.2d at 610; see 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1982) (Chapter 13 plan may extend payment
of debts provided for in plan over maximum period of five years); supra note I1 and
accompanying text (including support arrearage in Chapter 13 plan precludes enforcement of
dependent's claim for support arrearage).
38. 757 F.2d at 610; see supra notes 8, 34, 36 (state possesses strong interest in governing
domestic relations).
39. 757 F.2d at 610; see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982)
(amended 1984) (amendment to modernize federal bankruptcy law); supra notes 1-5 and
accompanying text (purpose of Code is to facilitate modern day debtor-creditor relationship).
40. 757 F.2d at 611; see In re Miller, 36 Bankr. 403, 405 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)
(bankruptcy courts do not possess jurisdiction to modify state domestic decree concerning
alimony, maintenance, or support, except to determine dischargeability under Code); In re
Moore, 22 Bankr. 200, 201 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (bankruptcy courts do not exercise
jurisdiction to alter or modify state-imposed support provision); supra notes 8, 34, 36 and
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may not include child support arrearages. 41
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Caswell, however, does not support
conclusively its holding to exclude child support arrearages from Chapter 13
plans.4 2 Other courts have found that the inclusion of a support arrearage in
a Chapter 13 plan that proposes full payment of the arrearage provides an
acceptable and preferential means of paying the debt. 43 By focusing on the
possibility of infringing on a state's right to protect its minor citizens," the
Caswell court apparently overlooked the protective provisions of the Code
that allow a Chapter 13 plan to include a support arrearage, while balancing
the competing interests of protecting the support claimant and facilitating
the debtor's rehabilitation.
4 5
Chapter 13 of the Code facilitates the debtor's rehabilitation, upon the
filing of a chapter 13 petition, by imposing an automatic stay on the
enforcement or collection of any claim against the debtor that arose prepe-
tition.46 Although an exception to the automatic stay allows a dependent to
accompanying text (domestic relations is area of state concern). Although Congress intended
chapter 13 of the Code to facilitate the debtor's effort to formulate an acceptable payment
plan, the good faith requirement prohibits the Code from shielding a debtor from his support
obligation. See supra note 4 (discussing good faith requirement of Chapter 13 plan).
41. 757 F.2d at 611.
42. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text (explaining Fourth Circuit's reasoning
in Caswell); infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text (explaining that federal courts apparently
possess power to determine whether to include support arrearages in Chapter 13 plan); infra
notes 51-67 and accompanying text (explaining that Code protects support claimants through
Chapter 13 process).
43. See In re Lanham, 13 Bankr. 45, 47 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1981) (confirming Chapter 13
plan that proposed full payment of support arrearage); see also In re Sak, 21 Bankr. 305, 308
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (concept of placing support claimant in separate class and providing
full payment of support arrearage posed acceptable solution of settling debt); In re Adams, 12
Bankr. 540, 543 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (Chapter 13 plan providing full payment of support
arrearage provides acceptable and preferential means of paying debt); infra notes 68-85 and
accompanying text (discussing Lanham, Sak, and Adams decisions).
44. See 757 F.2d at 609; supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing Caswell);
VA. CODE § 20-107.2 (1984) (state court shall determine custody and support of minor children);
supra note 36 (discussing policy of Commonwealth of Virginia to protect welfare of minor
dependents). Although the Caswell court emphasized the interest of the Commonwealth of
Virginia in protecting its minor citizens, the purpose of the Virginia legislation is to allow a
liberal interpretation of state law to protect minor dependents. See Morris v. Henry, 193 Va.
631, 638, 70 S.E.2d 417, 422 (195.) (courts should construe liberally statute protecting rights
and interest of infant dependents); VA. CODE § 20-107.2 (1984) A liberal interpretation of § 20-
107.2 of the Virginia Code allowing the State to determine the actual support obligation and a
federal court to determine the method of paying the arrearage in bankruptcy appears consistent
with the Code, which protects the support claimant by not extinguishing the debtor's support
obligation. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982) (child support arrearage not dischargeable through
bankruptcy); VA. CODE § 20-1072; infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text (discussing code
provisions protecting support claimant).
45, See infra notes 46-67 and accompanying text (explaining provisions of Code that
allow debtor to include support arrearage in Chapter 13 plan while protecting support claimant).
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (a)(6) (1982) (filing of petition in bankruptcy acts as stay
to claims that arose prefiling). The purpose of the automatic stay provided by § 362 of the Code
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collect a child support arrearage against property not property of the debtor's
estate,47 the inclusive language of section 1306 of the Code, which defines
property of the estate for Chapter 13 purposes, leaves virtually nothing
against which a dependent can proceed. 48 The automatic stay, which protects
property of the debtor's estate, apparently bars state enforcement of the past
due support payments, 49 at least until the bankruptcy court confirms the
is to insulate the debtor from the pressure of creditors attempting to enforce their claims against
the debtor and to enable the debtor to formulate a feasible payment plan. Id.; see 2 L. KING,
supra note 4, 362.01, AT 363-2-4; see also Lincoln-Alliance Bank & Trust Co. v. Dye, 108 F.2d
38, 38 (2d cir. 1939) (purpose of stay is to allow debtor time to develop feasible plan); In re
Island Park Associates, Inc., 77 F.2d 334, 337 (2d Cir. 1935) (purpose of stay is to enhance
debtor's rehabilitation); In re Kleinsasser, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1185, 1189 (BANKR.
D. S.D. 1981) (purpose of stay is to maintain status quo to afford debtor reasonable opportunity
to attempt rehabilitation); 1978 Senate Report, supra note I, at 54-55 (purpose)
of automatic stay is to give debtor relief from creditors). The automatic stay also protects
unsecured creditors because the stay prevents a diligence race between creditors to obtain a
judgment against the debtor. The stay, therefore, contributes to an orderly disposition of a
Chapter 13 plan which treats all creditors in a fair and equal manner in accordance with the
purpose of the bankruptcy laws. See 1978 Senate Report, supra note 1, at 49 (purpose of
bankruptcy law is orderly rehabilitation that treats all creditors equally).
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2) (1982) (automatic stay imposed on claims arising prepetition
does not apply to actions to collect alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not
property of debtor's estate); infra note 48 (explaining what constitutes property of debtor's
estate).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1982). The commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding under
the Code creates an estate. Id. § 541(a). Section 541 of the Code defines property of the estate
for bankruptcy purposes, and § 1306(a) incorporates the § 541 definition into chapter 13
proceedings. Id. §§ 541, 1306(a). Section 1306(a), however, expands § 541's definition of
property of the estate to include property acquired by the debtor after he files a bankruptcy
petition as well as postpetition earnings. Id. §§ 541, 1306(a). Section 1306(a), therefore, leaves
virtually nothing as property not property of the estate. Id. § 1306(a); see In re Sak, 21 Bankr.
305, 307 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982) (Chapter 13 estate consists of virtually everything debtor
owns or later earns or acquires prior to close of case); In re Lanham, 13 Bankr. 45, 46 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. 1981) (§ 1306(a) leaves little or no nonestate property).
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) (1982) (automatic stay imposed by filing of petition in
bankruptcy applies to property of estate until property is no longer property of estate); see also
In re Moore, 22 Bankr. 200, 201-02 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (automatic stay imposed by §
362(a) of Code protects all property of estate from any proceeding to collect support obligations);
In re Lanham, 13 Bankr. 45, 46 (Bankr. C.D. 11. 1981) (Section 1306 of Code leaves little or
no nonestate property against which dependent may proceed under § 362(b)(2) exception to
automatic stay which allows enforcement of support arrearages against non-estate property); In
re Adams, 12 Bankr. 540, 541-42 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (filing of petition in bankruptcy leaves
virtually no property available for satisfaction of support obligations). But see generally In re
Garrison, 5 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980). In In re Garrison, the bankruptcy court
considered whether the automatic stay imposed by § 362(a) of the Code upon the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy applies to stay the enforcement of alimony and child support arrearages.
Id. at 258; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982) (imposing automatic stay on claims of bankrupt's
debtors). In Garrison the debtor had filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Code.
5 Bankr. at 257; see II U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982) (governing adjustments of debts of individuals
with regular income). At the time of filing, the debtor was in arrears on payments of a state
determined alimony and child support obligation. 5 Bankr. at 257. Subsequent to the debtor's
Chapter 13 filing, the state of Michigan sought to compel the debtor to pay prefiling and
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debtor's Chapter 13 plan.s°
Relief from the automatic stay imposed by Chapter 13, however, is
available to the dependent upon a showing of cause or, without a hearing,
upon a showing of the necessity of relief to prevent irreparable damage to
postfiling support arrearages prior to confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan. Id.; see 11
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330. Although the Garrison court initially noted that § 362(d)(1) or (f),
providing relief from the stay, would dispose of the case, to clear confusion on the issue, the
court addressed whether the stay applies to prevent enforcement of alimony and support
arrearages. 5 Bankr. at 257, 258; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), (f); see also infra note 51 and
accompanying text (discussing relief from automatic stay under § 362(d)(1) and § 362(0). The
Garrison court found that the automatic stay was designed to prevent disruptive interference
by creditors in the bankruptcy process and should not provide debtors a sanctuary from support
obligations. 5 Bankr. at 259-60. The Garrison court suggested that Congress intended that a
debtor should resort to liquidation if he could not meet the burden of his current and past-due
support obligations while attempting to propose a feasible payment plan under Chapter 13. Id.
at 260. The bankruptcy court in Garrison, therefore, held that the automatic stay does not bar
enforcement of alimony or support arrearages, but limited its ruling to instances in which the
state has established the debtor's obligation to make payments prior to the court's confirmation
of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan. Id. at 261.
The reasoning of the Garrison court overlooked the express congressional purpose of
Chapter 13 to facilitate debtor rehabilitation, rather than force conversion to liquidation. See
supra notes I & 2 and accompanying text (discussing congressional purpose of Chapter 13).
The Garrison court failed to recognize the importance of the safeguards provided to support
claimants by § 362(d)(1) and § 362(f) of the Code, which provide relief from the stay in certain
circumstances. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1), 362(f); supra note 51 and accompanying text
(discussing relief from stay); se2 also In re Denn, 37 Bankr. 33, 36 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983)
(various procedures protect support obligation, such as motion for relief from stay); infra note
51 and accompanying text (discussing means of lifting stay under § 362(d)(1) and § 362(0 of
Code). The Garrison court also failed to recognize the importance of § 1327(b) of the Code,
which revests in the debtor uon confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan the property not needed to
fund the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b); see In re Moore, 22 Bankr. 200, 201-02 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1982) (§ 362(a) automatic stay should apply to child support arrearages because Congress
intended to protect debtor in Chapter 13 proceeding, and § 1327(b) provides adequate relief to
support claimant's right to enforce claim against arrearages); In re Bernstein, 20 Bankr. 595,
597-98 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (revesting in debtor property not needed to fund Chapter 13
plan adequately balances state interest in protecting dependents against federal interest in
effective bankruptcy law); infra note 50 (explaining § 1327(b)). The Garrison court apparently
imposed an unnecessary limitation on the automatic stay provision of the Code, which abridged
the congressional intent of the stay to give temporary protection to the estate of a debtor
attempting to formulate an acceptable repayment plan. See In re Moore, 22 Bankr. 200, 201-
02 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (Congress intended stay to protect Chapter 13 debtor); supra note
46 and accompanying text (discussing policy underlying automatic stay); see also In re Bernstein,
20 Bankr. 595, 597-98 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (policy of automatic stay is to help debtor
obtain relief under Chapter 13); In re Lanham, 13 Bankr. 45, 46-47 (Bankr. C.D. I11. 1981)
(automatic stay applies to child support arrearages, and state may not enforce arrearages against
property of estate absent lifting of stay).
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (1982). When a bankruptcy court confirms a Chapter 13
plan, all property of the estate not included specifically to fund the plan revests in the debtor.
Id.; see In re Sak, 21 Bank. 305, 307 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982) (confirmation of Chapter 13
plan vests in debtor all property of estate not provided for use in plan); In re Adams, 12 Bankr.
540, 541-42 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (same). Confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan, therefore,
provides support claimants with assets against which to enforce claims for support arrearages
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the dependent." Relief from the stay prior to confirmation of a Chapter 13
plan allows the dependent to proceed against virtually all assets of the
debtor.5 2 If the support claimant fails to seek or receive relief from the stay,
confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan that includes the support arrearage
protects the debtor from the dependent's claim for the arrearage by revesting
in the debtor, free and clear of any claim for a debt provided for under the
plan, all property of the estate not provided for use under the plan. 3 The
dependent, however, may still attempt to obtain relief from the automatic
stay which will subject the debtor's income provided for use under the plan
to the dependent's claim for the support arrearage1 4 On the other hand, if
the confirmed Chapter 13 plan does not include the support arrearage, then
the property revested in the debtor by confirmation is subject to the depend-
ent's claim for the arrearage.
55
because the property that confirmation revests in the debtor is within the exception of the
automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (1982) (confirmation of Chapter 13 plan vests in debtor
all property of estate not included specifically to fund plan); id. § 362(b)(2) (exception to
automatic stay allows enforcement of support arrearages against property not property of
estate).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1982) (court may lift stay imposed by filing of bankruptcy
petition on request of party in interest and for cause shown); id. § 362(0 (court shall grant
relief from stay, with or without hearing, as necessary to prevent irreparable damage to party
in interest); cf. In re Denn, 37 Bankr. 33, 36 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983) (court recognized that
motion for relief from stay protects rights of support obligee); In re Sak, 21 Bankr. 305, 306-
08 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982) (granting motion to vacate stay that prevented enforcement of
support arrearage because debtor failed to propose acceptable Chapter 13 plan within reasonable
time); In re Garrison, 5 Bankr. 256, 257 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980) (either § 362(d)(1) or §
362(0 of Code provides support obligee valid means of relief from automatic stay).
52. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (property of estate, protected by
automatic stay, includes virtually all assets of debtor). Relief from the automatic stay imposed
by the Code would subject virtually all assets of the debtor to the defendant's claim for support
arrearages. Id.
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (1982) (confirmation of Chapter 13 plan vests in debtor all
property of estate not provided for use in plan); id. § 1327(c) (property revested in debtor by
confirmation of Chapter 13 plan is free and clear of any claim provided for in plan); see also
In re Adams, 12 Bankr. 540, 543 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (applying § 1327(c) to revest in debtor
property not used to fund chapter 13 plan, free and clear of any claim provided for in plan).
54. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing Code's protection of property
revested in debtor by confirmation of Chapter 13 plan). When a confirmed Chapter 13 plan
includes a support arrearage, § 1327(c) of the Code prevents the support claimant from enforcing
the claim for the arrearage against property revested in the debtor upon confirmation. Id.; see
11 U.S.C. § 1327(c) (1982). Because the debtor's income funds the Chapter 13 plan, § 1327(b)
of the Code does not revest the debtor's income as property of the debtor upon confirmation
of the plan and, therefore, the debtor's income remains property of the estate protected by the
automatic stay and not by § 1327(c) of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (1982) (Chapter
13 plan shall provide for submission of debtor's future income to fund plan); id. § 1327(b)
(confirmation of Chapter 13 plan revests in debtor only property not provided for use by plan);
id. § 1327(c) (protecting property of debtor); supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text
(automatic stay applies to property of estate).
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(c) (1982) (Code protects property revested in debtor by
confirmation of Chapter 13 plan from claims provided for in plan only); see also id. § 362(b)(2)
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The Code further protects the dependent by requiring a bankruptcy court
to apply the good faith requirement imposed by the Code when the court
considers a Chapter 13 plan for confirmation.5 6 The good faith requirement
obligates a debtor proposing a plan under chapter 13 to do so with an honest
intent to meet his debts.5 7 Because the Code prohibits the discharge of a
child support obligation through the bankruptcy process, a debtor proposing
to pay a support arrearage through a Chapter 13 plan must provide for full
payment of the arrearage in the plan. 8 When a debtor fails to provide for
full payment in a proposed chapter 13 plan, courts have found that the
debtor has not met the good faith requirement. 59 Subsequently, if a debtor
fails to propose an acceptable plan within a reasonable time, then the
dependent may obtain relief from the automatic stay, or courts may dismiss
or convert the Chapter 13 case to a chapter 7 liquidation.6 Upon dismissal
of a case, the automatic stay no longer applies and the dependent may
proceed to collect the arrearage from the debtor.61 Conversion of a chapter
(automatic stay imposed by Code does not protect property of debtor from actions to collect
alimony, maintenance, or support).
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982) (requirement for confirmation dictates that debtor
must propose Chapter 13 plan in good faith); supra note 4 (discussing good faith requirement).
If a bankruptcy court finds that a debtor is attempting to use chapter 13 as a shield to avoid
paying past due child support obligations, or if the debtor proposes to pay less than 100% of
the child support arrears, then courts have found that the debtor has not proposed the plan in
"good faith" and have refused to confirm the plan because it abuses the spirit of Chapter 13.
See In re Burrell, 25 Bankr. 717, 724 (Bankr. D.C. 1982) (debtor has not proposed plan in
good faith if plan renders debtor incapable of meeting child support obligation); supra note 4
and accompanying text (discussing good faith requirements of Chapter 13 plan); cf. In re Kull,
12 Bankr. 654, 658-60 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1981) ("good faith" is discretionary judgment made
by court, which must consider debtor's motive behind filing plan).
57. See supra note 4 (discussing good faith requirement).
58. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(5), 1328(a) (1982) (debtor may not discharge support
arrearages through bankruptcy process); supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing
discharge exception); infra note 59 and accompanying text (good faith requires that Chapter 13
plan provide for full payment of debtor's support arrearage).
59. See Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193, 200 (D.C. cir. 1982) (good faith requirement
bars confirmation of Chapter 13 plan if debtor proposes plan for purpose iot permitted under
Code); supra note 7 and accompanying text (discharge of support arrearage through Chapter
13 is not permitted); In re Burrell, 25 Bankr. 717, 724 (Bankr. D.C. 1982) (Chapter 13 plan
does not satisfy good faith requirement if debtor proposes plan to assert his incapacity to meet
child support obligations); In re Lanham, 13 Bankr. 45, 47 (Bankr. C.D. Il. 1981) (Chapter 13
plan including support arrearage must provide for full payment of arrearage).
60. See In re Sak, 21 Bankr. 305, 306-08 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (granting relief from
automatic stay because of debtor's unreasonable delay in proposing acceptable Chapter 13
plan). A bankruptcy court may convert a Chapter 13 case to a chapter 7 liquidation or dismiss
the Chapter 13 case-whichever is in the best interest of creditors-because of any unreasonable
delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(1) (1982); see supra note
4 (defining best interest of creditors); see also 5 L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1307.0114](1),
AT 1307-5 (15TH ED. 1985) (FAILURE OF DEBTOR TO USE DILIGENCE IN GAINING CONFIRMATION OF
CHAPTER 13 PLAN CONSTITUTES UNREASONABLE DELAY).
61. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B) (1982) (automatic stay ceases to apply upon dismissal of
case); see also In re Income Property Builders, Inc., 699 F.2d 963, 964-65 (9th cir. 1982)
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13 case to a Chapter 7 liquidation, on the other hand, limits the endurance
of the stay until the court grants or denies the debtor a discharge of the
claims against his estate. 62 The dependent, however, still may elect to obtain
relief from the stay.
63
When, on the other hand, the debtor proposes an acceptable Chapter 13
plan that includes the support arrearage, confirmation of the plan would
insure the dependent a monthly payment of the support arrearage in addition
to the current support payments. 4 The bankruptcy courts protect the de-
pendent's right to the current support payments by considering the debtor's
ability to maintain postfiling support payments on a current basis when the
courts determine whether to confirm the Chapter 13 plan. 61 If the current
support payments become deficient, then, under the Code, the state is at all
times free to collect the deficiency because the claim against the deficient
current payments arises after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, and,
therefore, the automatic stay does not bar enforcement of the claim.6 In
addition, if the debtor defaults in the payment of a support arrearage under
the plan, the courts will either dismiss the Chapter 13 case or convert the
case to a Chapter 7 liquidation-whichever is in the best interest of unsecured
creditors.
67
Based on the protective measures taken by the Code, the few courts that
have considered whether to allow a debtor to include a child support
arrearage in a Chapter 13 plan have found that inclusion of the arrearage is
in the best interest of all parties involved, including the dependent. For
(bankruptcy court loses power to enforce stay after dismissal of bankruptcy case); In re Solar
Equip. Corp., 6 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 1219, 1220 (W.D. La. 1982) (once court dismisses
bankruptcy case, court loses jurisdiction to continue automatic stay).
62. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1982); see id. § 362(c)(2)(C) (stay imposed by filing of bankruptcy
petition endures in Chapter 7 case until court grants or denies discharge).
63. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing condition under which dependent
may obtain relief from automatic stay imposed upon filing of bankruptcy by §§ 362(a)(1),
362(b)).
64. See supra note 4 (discussing good faith requirement of Chapter 13 plan which requires
honest intent of debtor to fulfill plan as proposed); supra note 58-59 and accompanying text
(good faith requires debtor to provide full payment of support arrearage in Chapter 13 plan);
infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (discussing Code's attempt to assure consistent support
payments to dependent).
65. 1977 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 353. Congress intended that a debtor would
maintain his postfiling support obligations from his postfiling income. Id. Courts, therefore,
must consider the debtor's ability to meet his postpetition support obligations when determining
whether the debtor can comply with the proposed Chapter 13 plan. Id.; see 5 L. KiNG, COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 1322.0113](E), at 1322-k-17 (15th ed. 1985) (court must consider debtor's ability
to meet post-filing support obligations).
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (a)(6) (1982) (automatic stay imposed by Code applies only
to claims against debtor that had accrued prepetition); supra note 46 and accompanying text
(discussing automatic stay).
67. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6) (1982), as amended by Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 315, 98 Stat. 33, 356 (court may dismiss or convert Chapter 13 case to liquidation if debtor
materially defaults on term of confirmed plan).
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example, in In re Lanham6 the bankruptcy court considered whether a child
support arrearage was includable in a Chapter 13 plan.69 In Lanham, the
bankruptcy court confirmed a chapter 13 plan providing for full payment of
the debtor's support arrearage. 70 The debtor's ex-wife objected to the con-
firmation, claiming that because the Code prohibits the discharge of support
arrearages, a Chapter 13 plan may not include a support arrearage and that
the court should allow her to pursue available state remedies to collect the
child support arrearage.7 1 The Lanham court recognized the congressional
intent of the Code not to extinguish a support claimant's right to support
payments, but found that a Chapter 13 plan providing for full payment of
the support arrearage over a three year period was acceptable.7 2 Accordingly,
the Lanham court held that a Chapter 13 plan may include a debtor's support
arrearage if the plan provides for full payment of the arrearage within a
reasonable time."
In addition, the bankruptcy court in In re Sak74 indirectly supported the
inclusion of support arrearages in Chapter 13 plans. 75 In Sak, the court
considered whether to vacate the automatic stay imposed on the collection
of past due alimony and child support payments by section 362 of the Code.
76
In Sak, the debtor habitually proposed Chapter 13 plans providing for less
than full payment of his support arrearage. 77 The Sak court found that
68. 13 Bankr. 45 (Bankr. C.D. I11. 1981).
69. Id. at 46-47.
70. Id. at 46. In Lanham, the debtor's Chapter 13 plan provided for full payment of his
$1650 child support arrearage in full at $46.47 per month over a three year period. Id.
71. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982) (debtor may not discharge through bankruptcy
proceeding debts arising from child support obligation). In Lanham, nine days after the debtor
filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the Code, the State of Massachusetts ordered the debtor
to pay $61 per month on his support arrearage in addition to maintaining the $100 per week
current support payments. 13 Bankr. at 46. The debtor's ex-wife claimed that the state order
entitled her to enforce the $61 per month payment rather than accepting the $46.47 monthly
payment provided in the Chapter 13 plan confirmed by the Court. Id.
72. Lanham, 13 Bankr. at 47. The Lanham court explained that after the debtor had filed
his petition in bankruptcy, he had no right to enter any agreement affecting the property of his
estate without the court's permission. Id. The Lanham court, therefore, found that the state
court order, entered by agreement of the debtor, did not bind any property or assets of the
debtor's estate and was not enforceable against any part of the estate. Id.
73. 13 Bankr. at 47.
74. 21 Bankr. 305 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
75. Id. at 308.
76. Id. at 307; see 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982) (Code impose automatic stay on prepetition
claims against debtor filing petition under bankruptcy); see also supra note 46 and accompanying
text (discussing automatic stay imposed by § 362 of Code). In Sak, the debtor was $13,000 in
arrears on payment of alimony and child support at the time the debtor filed his Chapter 13
petition. 21 Bankr. at 306. The debtor's ex-wife attempted to enforce payment of the arrearage
post filing through state court proceedings. Id. The bankruptcy court held that § 362 stayed the
enforcement of payment of the arrearage. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 362 (filing of petition under
code stays enforcement of claims that had accrued prefiling). Subsequently, the debtor's ex-
wife commenced an action to vacate the automatic stay. 21 Bankr. at 306.
77. 21 Bankr. at 307; see id. at 308 n.5 (debtor's Chapter 13 plan in Lanham proposed
to pay approximately one-half of support arrearage).
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because the Code prohibits discharging support arrearages through a chapter
13 plan, the debtor's plan was not acceptable.7 1 In light of the debtor's
flagrant delay in proposing an acceptable plan, the Sak court vacated the
automatic stay, affording the dependent the right to enforce her claim for
the support arrearage in state court. 79 The Sak court, however, noted in dicta
that a Chapter 13 plan placing the dependent in a separate class and providing
for full payment of the arrearage would present an acceptable means of
settling the support arrearage, provided that the debtor submitted a feasible
Chapter 13 plan within a reasonable time.80
The bankruptcy court in In re Adams" similarly recognized the feasibility
of including support arrearages in Chapter 13 plans.8 2 In Adams, the
bankruptcy court considered the avenues available to a debtor's ex-spouse
to enforce a claim for alimony and support arrearages. 83 Although the Adams
court did not address directly whether to include the support arrearage in a
Chapter 13 plan, the court stated in dicta that a Chapter 13 plan proposing
full payment of the support arrearage as a distinct class provided an
acceptable and preferential means of paying the debt.8 4 The Adams court
explained that including a support arrearage in a Chapter 13 plan relieves
the spouse from pursuing collection of the arrearage outside the bankruptcy
process and provides the debtor a more orderly disposition of the support
arrearage.
8 1
In addition to apparently overlooking the protective provisions of the
Code that other courts have recognized as adequate protection for the support
78. Id. 307-08; see 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (1982) (debtor may not discharge alimony or
support arrearage through Chapter 13 plan).
79. 21 Bankr. at 307-08.
80. Id. et 308.
81. 12 Bankr. 540 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
82. Id. at 543.
83. Id. at 541-42. In In re Adams the bankruptcy court considered what constitutes
property that is not property of the estate and subject to a claim for alimony and support
arrearages under § 362 of the Code. Id. at 541; see 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982) (automatic stay
imposed by § 362 of Code applies to property of estate); see also supra notes 46-50 and
accompanying text (discussing automatic stay's protection of property of estate). In Adams, the
debtor, who was in arrears on payments of alimony and child support, filed a petition under
Chapter 13 of the Code and obtained confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan that did not include
the debtor's alimony and support arrearages. 12 Bankr. at 541. The debtor's ex-wife sought to
collect the alimony and support arrearages in state court, and the debtor claimed that the ex-
wife violated the automatic stay imposed by § 362 of the Code. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
The Adams court held that the ex-wife could collect the alimony and support arrearages from
property retained by the debtor that was not necessary to execute the debtor's Chapter 13 plan
and therefore not property of the estate. 12 Bankr. at 543.
84. 12 Bankr. at 543.
85. Id. The Adams court explained that including the support arrearages in a Chapter 13
plan would trigger § 1327(c) of the Code, which protects property of the debtor not used to
fund the Chapter 13 plan from claims of creditors provided for in the plan. Id.; see 11 U.S.C.
§ 1327(c) (1982) (protecting property vested in debtor by confirmation of Chapter 13 plan). The
Adams court noted the benefit of providing to the debtor the added security of the availability
of postpetition wages not needed to fund the Chapter 13 plan. 12 Bankr. at 543.
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claimant, the Fourth Circuit may have erred in finding that the federal
abstention doctrine bars federal jurisdiction to include support arrearages in
a Chapter 13 plan. 6 Federal courts recognize the abstention doctrine to
curtail federal interference in the subject of domestic relations.8 7 Courts,
however, have not addressed specifically the effect of the abstention doctrine
on a federal court's ability to exercise jurisdiction to include in a Chapter
13 plan an arrearage on a state-imposed support obligation. In Caswell, the
Fourth Circuit relied on Ridgeway v. Ridgeway,8 in which the Supreme
Court explained that federal courts should abstain from domestic relations
issues unless Congress intended specifically that federal law take precedence. 9
The Caswell court, relying on In re Garrison,90 then found that Congress did
not intend the code to grant jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts to interfere
with state imposed support obligations. 9' Other federal courts, however, have
applied the abstention doctrine to suggest that federal courts must abstain
from intervening in a domestic relations issue only when determination of
the issue at bar would force the federal court to establish the actual domestic
status, duty, or obligation, as opposed to determining the effect of the issue
at bar on the already existing domestic status, duty, or obligation. 92 In
86. See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text (explaining that federal courts may
exercise jurisdiction to include support arrearages in Chapter 13 plans).
87. See Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981). Federal
courts have recognized that although an action may meet the technical requirements for federal
diversity jurisdiction, federal courts generally abstain from interfering in domestic relation cases.
Id.; see, e.g., Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1982) (abstaining from determining
marital status of plaintiff in estate dispute), Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 843, 844 (1st Cir. 1981)
(abstaining from determining child custody in visitation rights dispute); Armstrong v. Armstrong,
508 F.2d 348, 349-50 (1st Cir. 1974) (abstaining from determining support obligation necessary
to settle mortgage and note dispute). Abstention is based on the sound policy recognized by
federal courts that domestic relations is of particular state concern and best left to the control
of the state. Firestone, 654 F.2d at 1215; see, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)
(subject of domestic relations belongs to laws of state); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018,
1025 (3rd Cir. 1975) (states possess expertise and strong interest in disposition of domestic
issues); Beuchold v. Ortez, 401 F.2d 371, 373 (9th cir. 1968) (domestic relations is local problem
best suited to state control).
88. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
89. Caswell 757 F.2d at 610 & n.3; see supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text (discussing
Caswell reasoning).
90. 5 Bankr. 256, 260 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980); see supra note 49 (discussing Garrison).
91. Caswell 757 F.2d at 610-11; see supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text (discussing
Caswell reasoning).
92. See, e.g., Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d at 137-38 (abstaining from exercising jurisdiction
because determining disposition of decendent's estate would require court to determine actual
alimony and support obligation itself); Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 844 (1st cir. 1981)
(abstaining because issue of whether ex-husband violated visitation rights would require deter-
mination of child custody); Bossom v. Bossom, 551 F.2d 474, 475 (2nd Cir. 1975) (abstaining
from nullifying rights incorporated into divorce decree). In Csibi v. Fustos, the Ninth Circuit
considered whether the court had jurisdiction to determine the discourse of a decedent's estate.
670 F.2d at 134-35. In Csibi, the plaintiff claimed that she had been married to the defendant's
deceased spouse prior to the defendant's marriage to the decedent. Id. at 135. The plaintiff
alleged that the prior marriage to the decedent never had been dissolved, and, therefore, she
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addition, legislative history and decisions by bankruptcy courts recognize
that the child support obligation of a debtor, once established by the state,
is subject to federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings to determine
whether an obligation is actually support or merely labeled support. Accord-
ingly, the federal bankruptcy courts possess jurisdiction to determine that an
obligation is in fact not support and, therefore, is dischargeable through the
bankruptcy process. 93
Applying to Caswell both the theory of federal abstention which mandates
abstention only when a federal court must determine the actual domestic obliga-
tion, and the federal courts' jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings to deter-
mine the actual status of an obligation labeled "support", fails to suggest
the necessity of federal abstention in Caswell. Although Caswell did not in-
volve the status of the support obligation, the determination of the method
of payment of the support obligation is a lesser infringement on the existing state-
imposed obligation than determining whether the obligation is actually not
support and, therefore, dischargeable. 94 In Caswell the State of Virginia had
established the debtor's support obligation, and the debtor simply attempted
to afford himself a feasible means to pay his past due support payments by
including the arrearage in a Chapter 13 plan.95 Under various federal
decisions, the Fourth Circuit apparently possessed the power to protect the
debtor from the dependent's collection of the support arrearage by including
the support arrearage in a Chapter 13 plan because allowing the arrearage
was entitled to inherit the decedent's estate. Id. The Ninth Circuit elected to abstain from the
case because determining the discourse of the deceased's estate would require the Ninth Circuit
to determine the marital status of the plaintiff and the decedent. Id. at 137-38. The Ninth
Circuit, however, explained that the abstention doctrine applies only when a federal court must
determine marital status, support payments, or award custody of a child. Id. at 137. Similarly,
in Firestone v. Cleveland Trust, the Sixth Circuit abstained from determining the amount owed
to the plaintiff by her ex-husband as alimony and support obligations. 654 F.2d 1212, 1217-18
(6th Circuit 1981). In Firestone v. Cleveland Trust, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the
court had jurisdiction to determine the enforceability of alimony and support obligations against
a third party beneficiary of the separation agreement. Id. at 1214. In Firestone, the plaintiff
filed suit claiming that she could enforce her claim for alimony and support arrearages against
a third party beneficiary of her separation agreement. Id. at 1213-14. The sixth Circuit found
that determining the enforceability of the alimony and support obligation would require the
court to determine the actual alimony and support obligation of the ex-husband and, accordingly,
declined to exercise jurisdiction over the entire case. Id. at 1217-18.
93. See, e.g., In re Jones, 28 Bankr. 147, 150 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1983) (dischargeability
of support arrearages is federal question under bankruptcy law); In re Lovett, 6 Bankr. 270,
271 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) (although state law governs determination of support obligation
itself, federal law determines dischargeability in bankruptcy of past due payments of obligation
labelled "support"); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434, 439 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) (federal law
determines effect of bankruptcy on support obligations and, accordingly, what constitutes
support for dischargeability purposes); see also 1977 Housa REPORT, supra note 2, at 384
(bankruptcy law determines what constitutes support for dischargeability purposes).
94. See 757 F.2d at 609 (sole issue in Caswell was whether Chapter 13 plan may include
support arrearage).
95. 757 F.2d at 608-09.
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simply would determine the method of payment-not the obligation itself. 96
Given the various federal explanations of federal abstention as it applies to
domestic relations, in addition to the bankruptcy courts' ability to determine
whether state imposed support obligations are in fact support, the Fourth
Circuit may have erred in finding that the allowance of support arrearages
in a Chapter 13 plan would be an unwarranted interference by the federal
court into an area of state concern.
9 7
The rationale behind the domestic abstention policy supports the conclu-
sion that the federal courts possess jurisdiction to determine the disposition
in bankruptcy of a state imposed support obligation. Federal courts practice
domestic abstention in areas in which the state possesses the expertise needed
to rule on domestic issues concerning its citizens and when the evidence
needed to gain insight into the needs of the parties would overburden a
federal court.98 When the state establishes an obligation, as in the case of
child support, and the area of its application is a federal area, such as
bankruptcy, the abstention doctrine should not apply because the disposition
of the support obligation in bankruptcy is outside an area of state
expertise and within the scope of federal law.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's concern that allowing child support
arrearages in Chapter 13 plans would invite federal bankruptcy courts to
modify or alter state imposed obligations is perhaps an overstatement of
effect. 99 By allowing a child support arrearage in a Chapter 13 plan, the
federal court would provide a feasible means of fully paying a debt that a
debtor previously was unable to repay. Including the arrearage would also
further the purpose of chapter 13 of the Code by affording the debtor an
opportunity to rehabilitate his financial situation while retaining possession
of his assets. °0 Additionally, creditors benefit because the debtor can develop
more easily a feasible plan under which the creditors will receive a greater
96. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing Cisibi and Firestone decisions).
97. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (Csibi and Firestone decisions warrant
abstention when federal court must determine actual domestic obligation such as amount of
support payments); supra note 93 and accompanying text (federal courts may determine
disposition in bankruptcy of arrearage on already existing support obligation).
98. See Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 136-37 (9th Cir. 1982) (federal court should abstain
from determining domestic issues because state possesses expertise in field of domestic relations);
Firestone v. Cleveland trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1217 (6th Cir. 1981) (federal courts should
abstain from determining domestic obligations because such obligations arise under state law
and states are better situated to hear and determine needs of citizens within state); Buechold v.
Ortez, 401 F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1968) (federal courts should abstain from domestic issues
because state is in better position to view needs of parties in light of costs of living and,
therefore, can determine more correctly amounts needed as alimony and support obligations).
99. See 757 F.2d at 610-11 (Caswell court found that including support arrearages in
Chapter 13 plan would invite federal courts to alter or modify state imposed method of
payment); supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (including support arrearage in Chapter 13
plan would be lesser infringement on support obligation than determining nature of obligation
for dischargeability).
100. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (purpose of chapter 13 is to facilitate
disposition of debts without resort to liquidation).
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amount than under a Chapter 7 liquidation.' 0 Furthermore, dependents
benefit through the continued income provided by the current support
payments'0 2 as well as payment of the support arrearage under the Chapter
13 plan. 03 The multiple benefits, coupled with the Code provisions protecting
the states' interest in providing for minors, warrant inclusion of child support
arrearages in Chapter 13 plans.
If federal courts follow the Fourth Circuit's holding in Caswell, parties
filing a Chapter 13 plan who are in arrears for child support obligations will
encounter an unnecessary barrier. Excluding support arrearages from Chapter
13 plans will force debtors to attempt to propose a feasible Chapter 13 plan
for discharging debts that are dischargeable under the Code, while remaining
immediately liable to dependents for past due child support payments.'0
4
Uncertainty concerning the amount of future funds available to fund the
proposed plan, due to the dependent's ability to enforce a claim for a support
arrearage at any time after confirmation, undoubtedly will hamper debtors'
efforts to propose an acceptable plan. The inability to propose an acceptable
plan could force debtors to resort to a Chapter 7 liquidation. 05 Forcing
liquidation is contrary to the congressional policy underlying Chapter 13 to
allow debtors the opportunity to propose a feasible, "good faith" plan to
discharge their debts. '06 Courts, therefore, should recognize the positive effect
that results from including support arrearages in Chapter 13 plans. 0 7 Inclu-
sion of support arrearages in Chapter 13 plans proposing full payment of
101. See In re Henry, 4 Bankr. 220, 223 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980); see 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(4) (1982) (Chapter 13 plan must provide creditors at least amount receivable under
liquidation); see also supra notes 11, 27, 53 and accompanying text (including support arrearage
in Chapter 13 Plan affords debtor security and flexibility in developing acceptable plan). In In
re Henry the bankruptcy court recognized the benefits provided to creditors and the debtor by
a Chapter 13 plan. Id. The Henry court noted that creditors likely will receive a greater amount
under a Chapter 13 plan than under a Chapter 7 liquidation because Chapter 13 allows a debtor
to extend payments and requires the plan to provide at least the amount that creditors would
receive under a liquidation proceeding. Id. The Henry court also recognized that the debtor will
gain pride from repaying his debts under the flexible plan while retaining possession of his
assets and protecting his credit standing. Id.
102. See supra text accompanying note 65 (court confirms Chapter 13 plan only if debtor
can maintain current support obligations as well as payments required under plan); see also
supra notes 4, 57 and accompanying text (discussing "good faith" requirement of Chapter 13
plan).
103. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (Code and bankruptcy courts protect
dependent's right to arrearage and current support payments).
104. See supra notes 11, 27 and accompanying text (if courts exclude support arrearage
from Chapter 13 plan, then dependents may proceed against property of debtor not needed to
fund plan upon confirmation).
105. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(5) (1982) (party in interest may force debtor to liquidate for
failure to propose an acceptable plan); supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing
bankruptcy courts' ability to convert Chapter 13 case to liquidation).
106. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (congressional purpose of Chapter 13 is to
provide alternative to Chapter 7 liquidation for individual debtors with regular income).
107. See supra notes 64-85 and accompanying text (discussing positive effect of including
support arrearage in Chapter 13 plan).
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